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The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still
perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopa-
thology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features,
the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features
appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of
largely heterogeneous functional and (self-)representational levels. These levels can be
arranged within a gradually evolving, onto- and phylogenetically plausible framework
which proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex con-
ceptual and meta-representational processes of agency and ownership, respectively. In
particular, three fundamental levels of agency and ownership processing have to be distin-
guished: The level of feeling, thinking and social interaction. This naturalistic account will
not only allow to ‘‘ground the self in action”, but also provide an empirically testable tax-
onomy for cognitive neuroscience and a new tool for disentangling agency and ownership
disturbances in psychopathology (e.g. alien hand, anarchic hand, anosognosia for one’s own
hemiparesis).
! 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Throughout our everyday life we continuously perform actions, often accompanied with the phenomenal experience of
‘‘mineness” of our own actions.1 What does it mean, however, to experience an action asmy action? The following work aims at
developing a comprehensive naturalistic account of the experience of ‘‘mineness” of an action (which, as will be shown, actually
requires two different accounts: One account of the experience of agency and one of the experience of body ownership) that can
be easily integrated into a naturalistic theory of the self and of self-consciousness. This account not only serves as a purely con-
ceptual framework, but—as will be demonstrated in the last section—also provides an experimentally testable taxonomy for
neuroscience and cognitive science and an explorative tool for investigating neuropsychological disturbances of agency and
ownership. We will argue that, in particular, one has to differentiate (i) an individual-orientated cognitive dimension of agency
and ownership from a socio-normative dimension of agency and ownership. Moreover, within the individual-orientated cogni-
tive dimension, one has to differentiate (ii) between a feeling and a judgment of agency as well as between a feeling and judg-
ment of ownership. As an exemplary use, it will be shown that this distinction is very fruitful to analyze and re-describe
psychopathological case studies.
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1 This experience occurs mostly in an implicit, unconscious way; only under special conditions of voluntary attention do we become explicitly aware of what
we are attempting to do and of ourselves as the initiator of these actions (Legrand, 2007; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2007).
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2. Features of self-consciousness: Who are we?
Self-consciousness typically comprises certain characteristic features of our experiences:
1. The unity of our experiences,
2. The perspectivity of our experiences,
3. The sense of ownership of body parts,
4. The sense of agency of actions,
5. The sense of authorship of thoughts, and
6. The transtemporal integration into autobiographical knowledge (Bermúdez, 1998; Damasio, 2000; Metzinger, 2003;
Newen & Vogeley, 2003).
All these phenomena can be characterized on both an individual cognitive level and a social and normative level (as was
demonstrated e.g. with respect to emotions by Zinck and Newen, 2007). In this paper, we will describe both dimensions for
agency and ownership.
It was traditionally assumed that there has to be a distinct, non-reducible entity called self which would underlie these
core features, functioning e.g. as the realizer of the unity of our experiences and of transtemporal unity, as the center of our
perspective or as the bearer of the sense of mineness of actions and thoughts. Recently, an alternative approach that tries to
account for the phenomenology of self-consciousness has received widespread attention: The claim that there is a phenom-
enally quite unitary and central self-model (at least in non-pathological circumstances), but no actual self. According to this
approach, the supposition of a self has to be denied since it is always thought of as non-natural. It seems, however, as if both
traditional positions, like those put forward by Descartes and Kant, as well as recent accounts, such as Thomas Metzinger’s
Being no one (2003), have overlooked an important alternative by neglecting the difference between the representing self and
the represented self-model2: While the self is—at least from a naturalistic view—best understood as the objective, biological-
cognitive representational system with special characteristic self-representational capacities, the self-model is the subjective
representation of oneself constructed3 by one’s self-representational system based on one’s perceptions, emotions, beliefs,
etc. (Newen & Vogeley, 2007). Under functional and representational levels of description, self-representations (e.g. a self-mod-
el) are not build up by a homogenous monolithic entity—as it appears phenomenally—, but by different modules operating on
different levels of representational and functional complexity.
Within a naturalist account of human self-consciousness (defined as the ability to represent one’s own bodily and mental
states as one’s own states), a recent systematic analysis has been able to identify different levels of self-representation char-
acterized by the increasingly complex representational structure and the increasingly complex representation formation
processes (Newen & Vogeley, 2003). On these grounds, we have to distinguish at least three different levels: A non-concep-
tual level, at which states are represented in a non-analyzable way (including an only implicit self-representation), a con-
ceptual level,4 at which properties can be systematically ascribed to different objects (including the explicitly represented
self), and a meta-representational level, where mental representations can themselves be represented (and attributed to the
self or to others).
The advantage of this framework is that the complex phenomenon of self-consciousness is now characterized by specific
gradually proceeding systematic competencies that can be distinguished by (i) their formal representational structure, (ii)
their developmental acquisition in childhood development, (iii) their differential break-down in certain neurological or psy-
chopathological circumstances, (iv) their behavioral correlate in psychological paradigms and (v) their neural correlate in
neuroimaging or lesion studies.
Not only self-consciousness as a whole, but also each of its core features resorts to analogous systematic competencies
that can be distinguished by the same (or at least similar) individuation criteria which also evolve in gradual steps. This will
be shown in this paper by example of the experience of agency and of ownership. In other words: Although each of the core
features of self-consciousness appears as a phenomenally unitary and central processing module, they in fact consist of
rather complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and (self-)representational levels, where the
most basic levels consist in sensorimotor processes, while the most elaborated levels comprise conceptual and meta-repre-
sentational processes. By identifying and characterizing each of the systematically relevant levels, we obtain a promising
method to ‘‘naturalize” complex mental phenomena, a challenge which formerly seemed to be insurmountable.
2 While traditional positions presuppose only a self, portraying it as a non-reducible entity (a Cartesian res cogitans or a Kantian transcendental ‘I’), Metzinger
assumes only a self-model, excluding any additional use of self. In a naturalist view, however, it seems necessary to adopt both, the self and the self-model, in
order to account for self-related pathologies.
3 Although the self-representation is ‘‘constructed” by the self-representing system, this does not imply that it is a mere fantasy without any represented
entity in the real world (as apparently connoted by Metzinger’s usage of the term). Rather, this construction reflects facts of a genuine object of the world: the
self. Rather than ‘‘being no one” (Metzinger, 2003) we are self-representing cognitive systems.
4 Newen and Vogeley (2003) make a distinction between conceptual and propositional representations: For the latter also sentential connectives have to be
represented. This distinction will not play a role here such that our usage of ‘‘conceptual” comprises propositional representations.
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3. What are we experiencing: Agency and ownership
In our everyday experience of our voluntary actions we have a certain phenomenal experience of ‘‘mineness” of
these actions. For example, when reaching for a cup, I know this to be my action. This experience, however, involves
at least two fundamentally different aspects of minimal action-related self-awareness, which—in this case—coincide and
are phenomenally indistinguishable: The sense of agency (SoA), i.e. the registration that I am the initiator of my reach-
ing for a cup (rather than somebody or something else),5 and the sense of body ownership (SoO), i.e. the registration that
my arm which is reaching for a cup belongs to me (rather than belonging to somebody or something else). In more gen-
eral terms, ownership is the registration that parts of one’s own body belong to oneself, regardless of whether it is moving
or not and whether this movement is voluntary or involuntary.6 In case of passive movements, however, SoA and SoO
dissociate. If someone else moves my arm towards a cup, I have no longer a SoA (i.e. I no longer experience myself as
being the initiator of the action), but I still retain a SoO: The arm that is moving towards the cup is still experienced
as belonging to me, i.e. as my arm (Gallagher, 2000).
As will be shown in the remainder of the paper, these two senses—which are often confounded both in theoretical
and experimental work (for further analysis, see Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen, 2007)—are analog in their formal rep-
resentational structure in that each of them can be framed in a comprehensive multi-level framework which gradually
increases in representational and functional complexity and proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor repre-
sentations to full-blown conceptual representations of agency and ownership, respectively. Each level of the SoA
and the SoO, respectively, will be individuated by means of the following individuation criteria: (i) Its form of repre-
sentation, (ii) the cognitive capacity it makes use of, (iii) the underlying neurocognitive process and (iv) its differential
break-down in certain neurological or psychopathological circumstances. The different levels interact with each other
by both bottom-up and top-down-processes. The SoA and the SoO are, however, clearly distinguishable not only on
conceptual, but also on phenomenal, neurocognitive and psychopathological grounds. By means of the aforementioned
criteria of individuation one can identify at least four systematic levels of the SoA and the SoO, respectively (see
Table 1).
4. Preconditions of agency and ownership: Sensory registration of action–effect-couplings
4.1. General characteristics
In order to experience oneself as the initiator of one’s own actions, it is a very basic prerequisite that a system learns to
systematically register a certain sensory event as the typical effect of its own actions. This can be realized on the basis of two
different kinds of non-conceptual representations: On a very basic level, this action–effect-registration results in a situated
and momentary representation. What is learned on this level is to represent a certain sensory event as the effect of a certain
type of action (which is de facto my action, since there is no systematic covariation of other events), thereby establishing a
basic momentary self-environment distinction which includes representing the effect as produced by me and by my body
parts (for a more detailed explanation of the role of action–effect-couplings for building up a self-environment distinction
see Vosgerau & Newen, 2007).
The self-relation7 is, although de facto present, not yet represented. So, what we accomplish at this basic level of sen-
sory covariation is a momentary self-environment distinction which nevertheless allows a basic representation of my ac-
tion. On the phenomenal level, we already have a momentary sense of initiating an action, although we cannot yet speak
of a sense of agency (it is not represented as my action). This can be nicely illustrated by looking at persons suffering from
a loss of proprioception (patient GL, see Farrer, Franck, Paillard, & Jeannerod, 2003; Fourneret, Paillard, Lamarre, Cole, &
Table 1
Levels of the sense of agency and the sense of ownership
Sense of agency Sense of ownership
Non-conceptual and momentary representation Sensory registration of action–effect-couplings
Non-conceptual and stable representation Feeling of agency Feeling of ownership
Conceptual representation Judgment of agency Judgment of ownership
Meta-representation Ascription of moral responsibility Meta-representation of ownership
5 For a more detailed explanation of this definition of the SoA and its difference as compared to other currently often used definitions (e.g. the definitions
proposed by Gallagher, 2000; Frith, 2005 or Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005a, see Synofzik et al., 2007).
6 A distinction between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership was first suggested by Gallagher (2000). The definitions and neurocognitive
characterizations we use, however, differ in many important aspects from Gallagher’s definitions and characterizations (see Synofzik et al., 2007). Nowadays,
this distinction has already become rather common in the current literature (see, for example, de Vignemont and Fourneret (2004) or Tsakiris and Haggard
(2005a)).
7 The self-relation is always understood as an essential self-relation, i.e. a de se and not simply a de re relation.
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Jeannerod, 2002). If such a person cannot see her hand but starts to move it forward, she develops a momentary sense of
initiating the action, but since there is no ongoing control of the hand movement there is no stable feeling of agency. On
this level, the sensory action effect representation can be best described as a non-conceptual and momentary representa-
tion ‘‘This is an initiation of action”.
This most basic level functions as a registration of action–effect-couplings and is a necessary prerequisite for both
the SoA and the SoO. It is a non-conceptual, momentary representation of oneself being the agent which can be used
by the cognitive system for multiple purposes. For example, action–effect-registration is useful for building up basic
goal-representations, for starting basic action planning and especially for dealing more efficiently with self-induced sen-
sory stimulation. Moreover, the information conveyed by the action–effect-registration can also be recalibrated in differ-
ent ways, depending on what the task or context requirements are. For instance, when action–effect-registration
functions as part of the integration of self-induced sensory stimulation, it can serve either to cancel the self-induced
effect (thus preserving higher attention resources for world-induced sensory stimulation in sensory-overloaded con-
texts), to attenuate the self-induced effect (thus still allowing perceptual awareness of it in contexts when further cog-
nitive control is required) or to highlight the self-induced effect (thus allowing to disambiguate one’s own action effects
in ambiguous, complex action contexts). Thus, action–effect-registration serves many heterogeneous pragmatic, execu-
tive functions.
Moreover, the basic registration of action–effect-couplings is also a necessary prerequisite for the SoO as well as the SoA:
In order to experience a certain body part as part of one’s own body it is a very basic prerequisite that a system learns to
systematically register certain sensory inputs as the sensory inputs that arise from one’s own body (rather than from some-
one else’s body or from the world). It allows to construct a momentary (non-stable) representation of the mineness of the
body parts. Only in the course of acting, we can learn to reliably distinguish the sensory information which belongs to our-
selves and that which does not, since only in this case we can register systematic covariations between sensory inputs and
our actions and thus distinguish it from sensory input just coincidentally affecting us from the surroundings. Nevertheless,
on this level, the distinction between ownership and agency is not yet made by the system itself (i.e. it is not represented);
rather, both aspects of the mineness of the action are present in the momentary non-conceptual representation of me being
the agent.
4.2. Neurocognitive mechanism
The action–effect-registration presupposes only very parsimonious requirements to the action control capacities: First,
the system must start to move somehow, i.e. it just has to perform spontaneous, non-intended, non-goal-directed move-
ments. Children are known to execute such spontaneous movements even long before birth. Thus, contrary to all the follow-
ing stages, no special capacity of action control is actually needed so far (not even an action prediction—as needed, e.g. for the
instantiation of a comparator mechanism; see below). Second, the system must have the ability to detect and store system-
atic covariations—an ability inherent to neural network processing from its earliest stages (Hebb, 1949). No other cognitive
capacity and no other neurocognitive mechanism is needed. Thus, the explanation of the registration of action–effect-cou-
pling relies on unproblematic presuppositions.
The empirical plausibility of such a registration capacity and its distinction from the next, more complex level is
well-supported by several studies from developmental psychology as summarized, e.g. by the developmental two-stage
model of intentional agency from Hommel and colleagues (for review see Hommel & Elsner, in press): On this first le-
vel, non goal-orientated reflexive movements are performed and the simultaneously occurring sensory events are sim-
ply explored. If certain movements and sensory events occur often together and the movements are performed over
and over again, simple learning mechanisms cause an action–effect association learning (Elsner & Hommel, 2001).
For example, 2-month-old infants can modulate their oral activity (sucking on a dummy pacifier) to increase the optical
clarity of a film presented to them or to control the pitch variation of a sound (Rochat & Striano, 1999). Furthermore,
2–6 month-old infants can, on a very basic level, monitor and control their kicking and reaching behavior on the basis
of these action–effect contingencies, as illustrated, for example, by the finding that they pedal longer if this leads to a
systematic consequent movement of a mobile (Hommel & Elsner, in press; this example well illustrates the aforemen-
tioned thesis that action–effect-registrations on this level are not yet necessarily used for installing a phenomenal expe-
rience of self-agency, but rather serve many pragmatic executive functions). Only when action–effect-associations are
reliably learned and ready for (inverted) use for the motor system, intentional agency can develop: While the associ-
ations are acquired through executing movements and exploring their sensory effects (motor activity? sensory system),
they are a necessary prerequisite for the goal-oriented tuning of intended actions (imagined sensory state?motor activ-
ity) (Hommel & Elsner, in press). Since the latter inverse representations and, more generally, internal representations of
actions and action effects are not yet systematically established and the self-relation is not represented, the registration
still depends on the immediate presence of the action and action effect. Hence, the underlying action representation
lacks transtemporal stability. Correspondingly, the ability to act in a truly goal-oriented fashion and to anticipate action
consequences of ones own actions—both hallmarks of the next level of agency, the feeling of agency—emerge much la-
ter, namely from 9 months of age onwards, than the capacity to detect sensorimotor contingencies (Hommel & Elsner,
in press; Tomasello, 1999).
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5. Dimensions of agency
5.1. Feeling of agency
5.1.1. General characteristics
If the action–effect-registration is systematically used by the cognitive system to establish a stable representation of an
action as self-produced, then the non-conceptual feeling of being the agent is produced (feeling of agency, FoA). What is
learned on this level is to establish a stable perception-based representation of the effect of one’s own action as the effect
of one’s own action. The self-relation is now represented, although still in a non-conceptual (implicit) way. This agency-rep-
resentation is in some way abstracted from the action such that the feeling of being the agent still is present even if the ac-
tion is already over. Such a feeling can be persistently accessed and attended to although it can be established independently
from any conceptual, a fortiori linguistic representations. Based on the weighting process of action-related motor and sen-
sory cues on this level (see below), one can now establish a stable representation of the ‘‘mineness” of the action–effect such
that it becomes accessible for other non-conceptual cognitive sub-systems. An action is, however, merely classified as self-
caused or not self-caused—it is not attributed to the self. The self is only represented non-conceptually in the FoA because at
this level the representation is still not composed out of different parts for the self and for the property of being the cause.
Rather, the content ‘‘This is my action” is rather present or absent as a non-analyzable whole. Nevertheless, the implicit self-
representation being established on this level is a stable and abstract self-representation as opposed to the basic self-envi-
ronment representation relying on action–effect-couplings.
Importantly, an external attribution is still not possible at this level. Therefore, no such thing as a feeling that, say, Chris
has caused my action, can occur. Rather, in case of an inappropriate action effect, the action feels peculiar or strange, while in
case of an appropriate action effect, I feel a harmonious ongoing flow of my action sequence. Perceptual agency representa-
tions are not compositional and have no object-property structure, and are therefore non-conceptual (Newen & Bartels,
2007; Vosgerau, 2007). They do not allow for explicit representations of the self and hence not for attributions.
5.1.2. Neurocognitive mechanism
The FoA is produced by a gradual and highly plastic subpersonal weighting process of different action-related perceptual
and motor cues, which are partly afferent (visual feedback, proprioception) and partly efferent (action prediction, body sche-
ma) (see Synofzik et al., 2007, and Fig. 2). In case of congruency between these indicators (e.g. a match between internal pre-
diction and visual feedback), the experience of action is withheld from further processing and we experience self-agency by a
rather diffuse feeling of a coherent, harmonious ongoing flow of action processing. In case of incongruency between these
indicators (e.g. a mismatch between proprioception, motor intention and visual feedback), we experience an action as
strange, peculiar and not fully done by me. This experience might—inter alia—result from a mismatch between efferent
and afferent information.
One of the most important authorship cues is provided by a presupposed internal comparator mechanism which com-
pares a prediction about the sensory consequences of our action (computed on the basis of an efference copy issued as a
‘‘corollary discharge” of the motor command of the respective action) with the actual sensory feedback of the action (see
Fig. 1). A congruency between predicted and actual state may be used by the cognitive system to register a sensory event
as caused by oneself, while an incongruency may lead to the registration of a sensory event as externally caused (Feinberg,
1978; Frith, 1992); for a recent version and modification see (Frith, 2005; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000).
The comparator functions as one of the most important sensorimotor cues for the FoA. The acquisition and adaptation of
the internal predictions (which are entered into the comparison process together with the sensory afferences) can be de-
scribed as the result of an ‘‘internalization” process of one’s own causal relationships to the world: The representation of sta-
ble systematic sensorimotor contingencies between a certain action and its corresponding effect, which is learned in the
preceding stage of registration of action–effect-couplings, can be used to build up an internal prediction of an action effect
that is issued whenever an action is initiated (Synofzik, Thier, & Lindner, 2006; Vosgerau & Newen, 2007). If the action effect
matches the prediction, the prediction is preserved; if the action effect differs slightly over a constant sequence of actions,
the prediction is recalibrated accordingly (neurophysiological evidence for this mechanism was given for electric fish (Bell,
2001), crickets (Poulet & Hedwig, 2002) and also for humans (Haarmeier, Bunjes, Lindner, Berret, & Thier, 2001; Lindner,
Haarmeier, Erb, Grodd, & Thier, 2006; Synofzik, Thier, & Lindner, 2006)). The more systematic the contingencies between
action and action effect, the more stable and reliable the internal predictions about the upcoming sensory effects of one’s
own actions and the better a system’s capacity to differentiate between self-produced and non-self-produced actions. Thus,
the cognitive system is now no longer dependent on the presence of actual sensory feedback of the action (as for the regis-
tration of action–effect-couplings), but can internally represent the action consequences by internal predictions which thus
serve as ‘‘internal feedback signals” (Ito, 2005).
Yet there are many cases where the comparator output is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the FoA (Syn-
ofzik et al., 2007). Action-related perceptual and motor information—such as efference copies, sensory feedback modalities
(e.g. proprioception (Balslev, Cole, & Miall, 2007) or vision (Synofzik, Thier, & Lindner, 2006)), and their comparison—is rather
entered into a multifactorial weighting process bringing together different sense modalities (e.g. intermodal congruencies),
efferent–afferent congruencies, and different levels of cognitive processing that indicate agency of actions for a person (Syn-
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ofzik et al., 2007). The differential contribution and the weighting of the corresponding authorship cues vary in different sit-
uations and in different persons (for more details, see Synofzik et al., 2007).
5.2. Judgment of agency
5.2.1. General characteristics
If the non-conceptual FoA is further processed by the cognitive system by additionally involving conceptual capacities
and belief stances, then a conceptual, interpretative judgment of being the agent (judgment of agency; JoA) is produced.
What is learned on this level is to conceptually represent the effect of one’s own action as the effect of one’s own action. Based
on the belief formation process of weighting different cognitive, non-sensorimotor indicators (see below), one can now not
only perceptually represent the difference between ‘‘my action” and ‘‘not my action”, but propositionally and composition-
ally represent one’s own actions as one’s own or as the one of somebody else, i.e. the self is now explicitly represented as well
as the property of being the cause. Therefore, on this level, attributive judgments (e.g. ‘‘my action” vs. ‘‘the action caused by
Chris” or ‘‘the action initiated by the computer”) are possible. For each action, an interpretation mechanism can search for
the best explanation of the underlying sensorimotor perception, resulting in a specific belief formation about the origins of
the changes in perception: I can either believe that I am the author of the action or I can assume that someone or something
other than me is causing this effect.
By this characterization, the JoA differs from the FoA in the following three, partly interrelated respects:
(1) The JoA has an object-property structure, i.e. there are parts of the conceptual self-representation that represent the
system itself and parts that represent certain properties. Thus, whereas the FoA involved a non-conceptual (implicit)
self-representation, the JoA involves a propositional I-thought (with an explicit self-representation).
(2) Since conceptual agency representations are—contrary to the FoA—formed by inferential processes, they are influenced
by other conceptual representations like background beliefs. Consider, for example, you are the only person in a room,
in which something happens. Although you might not have any perceptual representation pointing in the direction
that you caused this event (e.g. no certain congruency between motor intention and sensory event), you can come
to conclude that it must have been caused by you because of your background beliefs that (a) nothing happens with-
out a cause and (b) you are the only possible cause in the relevant spatiotemporal region (de Vignemont & Fourneret,
2004). Thus, how the belief formation is performed depends on our way of rationalizing, i.e. our way of giving a (more
or less) plausible explanation for our experiences.
(3) While the FoA builds on the cognitive capacity to classify sensory events as one’s own or not one’s own, the JoA demands
the capacity to conceptually categorize causal forces in the interactionwith theworld. The conceptual categorizationhas to
meet different constraints (Newen & Bartels, 2007): The system has to have the ability (a) to attribute the same causal
force to different objects, (b) to attribute different causal forces to one and the same object, (c) to perform the attribution
stimulus-independently, and (d) to distinguish enough related properties such that a network of different causal dimen-
sions is established (i.e. it has to be able to differentiate between agency and other related properties, e.g. ownership).
Predicted
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Fig. 1. The ‘‘comparator mechanism” as an important authorship indicator for the feeling of agency. The feeling of agency is—inter alia—informed by an
internal comparator mechanism which compares predicted and actual sensory feedback: If both states match, the sensory event is attributed to one’s own
agency. If sensory feedback is discrepant with the sensory prediction, an external attribution of the causation of the sensory event occurs (modified after
Frith et al., 2000 and Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001).
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5.2.2. Neurocognitive mechanism
The JoA is formed by a rationalization process that normally has a FoA as input. Thus, the JoA normally starts with the
output of the weighting of sensorimotor authorship indicators (e.g. the comparator output) and then proceeds with ad hoc
theorizing and belief formation about oneself, which is produced by a weighting of cognitive authorship indicators (e.g. con-
textual cues, belief states, etc.). But the JoA does not necessarily presuppose a FoA. The rationalization process has multiple
inputs such that it works even if the FoA input signal is missing: Analogous to the sensorimotor weighting, also the weight-
ing of the various cognitive authorship cues varies in different situations and in different persons. For example, in the afore-
mentioned example of a person being alone in a room, the cognitive system draws mainly on situational, impersonal
background beliefs to decide whether an action effect is caused by oneself or not: The background beliefs about causation
and critical spatiotemporal patterns that are used in this situation to achieve a JoA are so general, that they do not depend
on the person’s individual biography and psychosocial context. For deciding, however, to whom agency is externally attrib-
uted—if it occurs—(e.g. to decide whether an action was caused by my friend Paul, by the computer, by the experimenter, by
God, etc.), the cognitive system must often draw on more specific personal background beliefs (which are, for example, stored
in form of a narrative) and social cues.
Next to these examples, additional empirical evidence for a cognitive weighting process is given in an indirect way by the
observation of the break-down of this process, e.g. in the case of agency delusions. Here, neuropsychological anomalies in
perceptual or affective processing are insufficient to explain the intrinsic nature of delusions, namely the fact that (i) an alien
experience is not accepted as a strange experience, that (ii) a delusional agency hypothesis about the perceived fact is formed
and that (iii) this is maintained despite different stored encyclopedic knowledge about the own behavior and despite the
testimony of others (cf. Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 2001). These features can only be explained by a misbalanced
integration of different cognitive cues, in particular background beliefs, contextual cues and action intentions.
Like the weighting of sensorimotor authorship indicators, also the weighting of cognitive authorship indicators usually
remains unconscious and is performed on a subpersonal level. Thus, although the belief formation involves reasoning pro-
cesses or narrative elements in order to proceed from a certain perceptually accessible premise (the result of the sensorimo-
tor weighting) or set of personal belief states to the conclusion that oneself or somebody else is the initiator of the action, this
does not necessarily have to be performed in a conscious way. Nevertheless, such a conscious evaluation is possible and
likely to occur when the discrepancy between several factors is significant.
On the level of JoA, a system is able to represent its action consequences and action effects as stable in space and time by
encoding them in form of propositional knowledge. These stable internal representations increase the system’s degree of
independency from direct (reafferent or exafferent) sensory input in that they are not just limited to predicting the very
momentarily upcoming sensory consequences, but extend beyond direct sensorimotor consequences to more abstract action
effects and beyond very immediate action consequences to spatially and temporally more distant action effects. This allows
building up an increasingly abstract goal representation as well as explicit and systematic judgments about causal action and
world relations. Thus, whereas the system was first capable of forming perceptually encoded internal representations of
one’s own direct sensory action effects, allowing the system to become independent from the actual presence of the action
effect (level of action control corresponding to the FoA), it can now anticipate more abstract action effects and can further-
more do so without coupling them to a specific motor pattern or a specific action–control loop. In other words: Self-agency
can now be represented not only independently from the actual action–effect, but also independently from the actual action.
5.3. Ascription of moral responsibility
5.3.1. General characteristics
If a cognitive system cannot only form agency beliefs and judgments, i.e. attribute a certain action to a certain author (in
the sense of being the cause), but also reliably register the mental state preceding the action—namely, the intentional action
planning—, it is capable of ascribing moral responsibility. The criteria for the ascription of moral responsibility (AoR) can be
defined as follows: An agency system A (as a minimally complex behavioral system that is able to produce a behavior B) is
morally responsible for its behavior B (with the consequences C) if and only if:
(I) A has an internal action plan including a representation of the behavior B (and some consequences C),
(II) A has sufficient insight into the normally possible consequences C of B,
(III) there are no contextual barriers which prevent A from doing B and thereby realizing the normally expectable conse-
quences C,
(IV) A’s doing B is embedded in a normative system, i.e. the doing is evaluated according to a normative rule as acceptable
or non-acceptable.
Taken together, these conditions mark the specific presuppositions required for moral responsibility: Conditions 1–3 are
necessary and sufficient for causal responsibility of a subject as an agent.8 Condition 4 is required to specifically mark the nor-
8 These three conditions go beyond being the mere cause, as characterized at the level of JoA where the plans of the acting system are irrelevant: I, as a living
thing, am the cause of the consequences of my reflexes, for example, but I am not causally responsible for them as the agent of the action.
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mative dimension of moral responsibility. The conditions shall be shortly elaborated: Criterion (I) allows us to separate actions
from mere behavior: Actions are based on an internal action plan (which may be unconscious at the time of acting) including
the consequences of the behavior (thereby excluding mere automatic reflex-like behavior or behavior caused by someone/
something else). Criterion (II) demands that the subject knows sufficiently what consequences C are possible under normal cir-
cumstances. This excludes several kinds of behavior as reasonable candidates for responsibility, e.g. if the subject’s ideas about
the consequences of its behavior are so mistaken that they have almost nothing to do with the actual consequences—despite the
fact that they might have been based on an internal action plan. Condition (III) grasps our strong intuition that I am not respon-
sible for my behavior if there are special circumstances which prevent me from realizing the behavior according to my existing
action plan (notwithstanding the fact that this plan might be appropriate to foresee the consequences which usually follow the
action). Condition (IV) reflects our notion that responsibility essentially includes that one can be either blamed or honored for
one’s behavior and this is only possible if we have standard expectations according to norms in a group. Knowledge of social
norms is closely connected with meta-representations of the form ‘‘I know that I should do A1 and should not do A2. Otherwise
mum will be angry and disappointed.” Hence, normative expectations presuppose an understanding of other people’s expecta-
tions about my actions: ‘‘She wants/expects me to do A1 and not A2.” In contrast, for a judgment of agency (JoA) no meta-rep-
resentation, i.e. no thought about particular mental representations of either myself or of others, was necessarily required. All
that is needed for a JoA is an attribution of an action to a certain agency system, which might, for example, be expressed in the
linguistic form ‘‘He caused this action” or ‘‘This is his action” (him being the mere cause). Moreover, while the AoR resorts to a
normative standard with an associated evaluation as acceptable or not acceptable, the JoA only involves a notion of causation
allowing the subject to differentiate between oneself or someone else as being the cause of action effects.
The normative expectations which underlie the AoR are internalized and individually adopted normative rules that offer a
standard of evaluation of the actions of a person. Since a normative rule is a rule determined by a culturally mediated social
interaction, responsibility is an essentially culture-dependent phenomenon: While suicide bombing is morally acceptable in
some radical ideologies, it is completely unacceptable in most cultural contexts (e.g. the Western European culture).
The meta-representational dimension of social interaction drawing on social standards and normative judgments has to
be distinguished from a person’s individual cognitive dimension of feeling and judgment, in that feeling (FoA) and judgment
(JoA) are both ontogenetically and phylogenetically more basic features. They are ontogenetically more basic in that they do
not require meta-representations and thus no construction of a model of one’s own or someone else’s mind (see next par-
agraph)—a capacity which is not learned until approximately the third year of life. They are phylogenetically more basic in
that they do not require the construction of socio-cultural normative rules—a capacity which presupposes a special kind of
competence that is developed in human social interaction, but not, for example, in ape interaction (‘‘cultural intelligence
hypothesis”). This fact was shown by recent studies in developmental psychology revealing that it is a specific human com-
petence to develop normative standards on the basis of systematic actions or observations (Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Llo-
reda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, in press).
However, once both dimensions—the individual’s cognitive dimension and the socio-normative dimension—are estab-
lished, they constantly interact and re-model each other by bottom-up and top-down processes (see Fig. 2). For example,
based on our low-level non-conceptual feelings about a certain action event we might modify our normative judgments,
e.g. when being personally involved we might come to a normative judgment that is mainly carried by emotional involve-
ment, but not by rational argument (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001); or when
lacking the capacity of emotionally assessing an action effect (e.g. due to a brain disease), we are impaired in forming out
moral judgments (Damasio, 2003). Vice versa, based on our metapresentational normative judgments and the standards
of our society, we might change the judgments about our actions. If, for example, a certain action is socially highly accepted,
we are more inclined to attribute agency to ourselves and maybe even develop a FoA. For example, when playing soccer, I hit
the ball and thereby make a goal, I have the feeling that I just had the right reaction, whereas when my hitting the ball pre-
vents it from going into the goal, I am more likely to have the feeling that the circumstances hindered my action.
5.3.2. Neurocognitive mechanism
To be capable to form an AoR, one has to combine the ability to build up meta-representations with the ability to form a
special mental model of oneself and of the other person: One not only has to be able to register one’s own and other people’s
mental states, but also to detect specifically those mental states that are part of the intentional action planning process, that
is, the internal action plan, the internal representation of the short- and long-term consequences and the internal represen-
tation of the self (the self-model). Furthermore, one has to be able to understand action as associated with normative expec-
tations and evaluations concerning others and concerning oneself. In short, a so-called Theory of Mind (ToM; Premack &
Woodruff, 1978) is required for AoR.
There is still a lot of controversy about the best functional description of ToM: There are mainly three basic theories,
namely the so-called theory-theories (Carruthers & Smith, 1996), the simulation theories (Davies & Stone, 1995; Dokic &
Proust, 2002), and interaction theory (Gallagher, 2005). Whatever theory is on the right track, it is clear that a ToM involves
the capacity to detect specific intentions (through the actions of others). This intention detection probably relies on the mo-
tor system’s use of internal inverse and forward models. More specifically, the proposal is that other’s intentions might be
detected by activating internal sensorimotor representations (‘‘internal models”) at a sub-threshold level when observing
their actions (for more details see Bosbach, Cole, Prinz, & Knoblich, 2005; Hamilton, Wolpert, & Frith, 2004; Wolpert, Doya,
& Kawato, 2003).
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The competence to decodeanother’s action intentions is not the only necessaryelement for the ascription of responsibility: The
socio-normative dimension of ascription of responsibility demands an additional, more specific component, namely the under-
standingofnormsandexpectationsandthecapacitytoactaccordingly.Thus,furtherspecificcomputationalsubstratesarerequired:
(1) A representation of a shared norms about what is expected,
(2) The capacity to detect ongoing deviations from that norm and
(3) To correct one’s behavior accordingly, and
(4) The capacity to do this not only from a first-person-perspective, but also from a third-person perspective, that is, from
the point-of-view of a ‘‘neutral subject” that is maximally free of particular, individualistic motifs and interests.
This list (which roughly follows the distinction by Montague & Lohrenz, 2007) is obviously not complete, but it presents
the fundamental requirements for a system in order to be capable of establishing an AoR. Moreover, these aspects have re-
cently received first empirical corroboration with respect to their neural substrates (for review see Montague & Lohrenz,
2007) and, most interestingly with respect to clinical practice, offer a first preliminary tool to categorize different aspects
in which socio-normative behavior might break-down in case of psychopathological disturbances or neurological lesions:
Whereas a patient with some specific lesion in the prefrontal cortex might be able to represent a shared norm (criterion
1) and to detect ongoing deviations (criterion 2), but fails to correct his behavior accordingly (criterion 3), a patient with
a lesion located in a slightly different prefrontal area might not even be able to represent the shared norm (criterion 1).
6. Dimensions of ownership
Like the SoA, also the SoO appears phenomenally as a central and uniform processing module, while in fact it is also a
complex crossmodal phenomenon of largely heterogeneous functional and representational levels. These levels can be sys-
tematically identified by strictly analogous individuation criteria as were used for identifying levels of agency:
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Fig. 2. Distinguishing different forms of bodily self-representations. The distinction between feeling, judgment, and meta-representation can be applied to
both the sense of agency and the sense of ownership. A preliminary model suggests which different sensorimotor and cognitive authorship indicators enter
each level of agency (a) and of ownership (b), respectively. For experimental investigation, either the relation and interaction between these six levels can
be tested (e.g. in a 2*3-design) or each level can be tested per se (e.g. by modifying, adding or omitting one of the respective authorship indicators).
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(1) Feeling of ownership (FoO). On this primarily perceptual level, the non-conceptual, low-level representation of being
the owner of one’s own body parts leads to the FoO. Analogous to the FoA, the FoO results from a multimodal weight-
ing of different sensory ‘‘ownership indicators”, but—like the efferent components in the FoA—it also includes a non-
sensory ‘‘top-down” component, namely a pre-existing internal body scheme which mediates and constrains sensory
‘‘bottom-up” inputs (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b) (see Fig. 2). In case of congruency between these ownership indica-
tors (e.g. a match between proprioception and visual feedback), the experience of being the owner of one’s own body
parts is withheld from conscious processing and we experience bodily ownership by a rather diffuse feeling of a coher-
ent, harmonious ongoing flow of bodily experiences. In case of incongruency between these indicators (e.g. a mis-
match between proprioception, body schema and visual feedback), we experience our body parts as strange,
peculiar or alien.9 On the level of feeling, a distinction between agency and ownership is present not only phenomeno-
logically (an active movement feels different than a passive movement or non-moving state of a limb), but also with
respect to the neurocognitive mechanism: In case of ownership, no internal prediction is issued and thus no comparator
mechanism triggered (a fact which was overlooked by Gallagher, 2000).
(2) Judgment of ownership (JoO). On this conceptual level, an explicit, interpretative judgment of being the owner of one’s
own body parts occurs. Analogous to the JoA, the JoO results from a weighting of different cognitive ownership indi-
cators (for a comparison between FoA/JoA and FoO/JoO, see Fig. 2). Thus, on this level, the non-conceptual feeling of
bodily ownership is further processed by conceptual capacities and belief stances to form an attribution of ownership.
For example, a mismatch between different sensory ownership indicators triggers (i) a primary basic feeling of not
being the owner of some body part and (ii) a second interpretative mechanism which looks for the best explanation,
resulting in a specific belief formation about the belonging of the body part: I can either believe that I am the owner of
the body part despite the mismatch or I can assume that someone or something other than me owns this body part. If
an external ownership attribution occurs, it is moreover an open question to whom the action is attributed. Several
illustrative examples for these processes will be given in the following section. There it will be revealed that the lack
of the distinction between FoO and JoO has not only caused several conflations in the investigation of the neural sub-
strates of the SoO (Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007), but also in the investigation of the neurocognitive pro-
cesses and the neuropsychological disturbances of the SoO.
(3) Meta-representation of ownership (MoO). At the meta-representational level, the notion of ownership is extended to
objects which are not proper parts of my body but are mine in the sense of belongings.10 This extended notion of own-
ership requires an explicit theory and thereby depends on background beliefs and socio-cultural norms. Crucially, what
belongs to me and what does not is—in the extended sense—a social question. Therefore, an adequate representation of
the ownership of objects requires (1) that I represent the object as belonging to me, (2) that others represent the object as
belonging to me, and (3) our mutual representation of these representations of the other, respectively. Since the latter is
clearly a form of meta-representation, we can speak of the meta-representation of ownership. In this way, many things
are represented as belongings of me by means of socio-normative attribution, thus depending heavily on beliefs about
socio-normative relations. For example, according to the norms in Western Europe, kids belong to their parents while
there exist also radical ideas (one may find, e.g. in Plato or in radical communism) according to which children are
belonging to the whole society and not especially to their parents. There are great cultural differences concerning a social
theory about what is part of me: For example, depending on the respective normative evaluation or social standards, I can
consider not only my children, but also my whole family or even my social peer group or regional population to be ‘‘part
of me”. Thus, taken together, one’s theory of body ownership is only one particular case of meta-representation of own-
ership—usually this meta-representation extends beyond the bodily self. As such a multidimensional bodily, psycholog-
ical and social meta-representation, it forms the fundamental basis for our self-understanding.
Like the AoR, the neurocognitive requirements for building up a MoO presuppose the capacity to build up meta-represen-
tations with the ability to form a special mental model of oneself and of others, respectively. Additionally, one has to build up
the computational substrates that are required to represent one’s own and the other’s ownership-attribution by social stan-
dards and normative evaluation. This means that one also has to be able to represent one’s own and the other’s norms about
one’s body and one’s social environment plus the according socio-normative attribution mechanisms.
7. Empirical application of the frameworks
Themulti-level frameworks of the SoA and the SoO can be used to informvarious empirical disciplines in their investigation
of agency andownership, e.g. developmental psychology, psychiatry or cognitiveneuroscience.Here,we takeneuropsychology
9 Gallagher (2005) distinguishes between the body schema and the body image. We offer a more detailed distinction for both the body schema (which
corresponds roughly to the registration of action–effect couplings and the FoO) and the body image (which contains both parts of what we call judgment of
ownership and meta-representation of ownership).
10 On the one hand, also objects that are not proper parts of my body can be integrated into the body schema (e.g. the tennis racket) when using it extensively.
This integration takes place on the level of FoO, but the object is not represented as a belonging (but wrongly as a body part). On the other hand, the extended
notion of ownership is not confined to objects apart frommy body: The question, whether a pregnant woman’s body is her own in the sense that she is the only
one to decide about abortion, for example, involves the extended notion of ownership for own body parts (we thank an anonymous reviewer for this point).
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as an example to demonstrate the applicability and analytical benefit of these frameworks. In particular, it will be shown that
they provide genuinely new and very differentiated explorative tools for analyzing and understanding disruptions of agency in
psychopathological and neuropsychological cases. In turn, these cases will also provide empirical support for the multi-level
frameworks by showing that their conceptual distinctions correspond to neuropsychological dissociations.
7.1. Disturbances of the sense of ownership
Current analyses of alien limb phenomena (Spence, 2002) are strongly confounded by the missing distinction between
agency and ownership components. Elaborating on the original definition by Brion and Jedynak (1972), we here suggest that
‘‘alien limb phenomena” include only disturbances of the SoO, but not disturbances of the SoA. This characterization is based
on the fact that—in contrast to the ‘‘anarchic hand”—alien limb phenomena do not per se entail any involuntary movements
and thus no disruption of agency, but only a disturbance in the subjective experience of the ownership of one’s own limbs
(for a roughly similar analysis see Gallagher & V!ver, 2004).
Following the thesis that the SoO is a complex crossmodal representation of different functional and representational lev-
els, alien limb phenomena can be present on different levels of the SoO, namely on the level of FoO, JoO or MoO. Accordingly,
the ‘‘alien hand syndrome” is an etiologically heterogeneous pathological disruption which might result from a deficit in the
FoO in some patients, but from a deficit in the JoO in others. A genuine disturbance of the FoO consists in the perceptual
experience of ‘‘alienness” (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991, p. 20) of one’s own limbs—a perceptual experience which is, however,
not further influenced by conceptual elaboration or involvement of belief states. Such a disturbance is described for patient
LA-O who suffered from a unilateral neglect:
‘‘On request, she admitted without hesitation that her left shoulder was part of her body and inferentially came to the same
conclusion as regards her left arm and elbow, given, as she remarked, the evident continuity of thosemembers. Shewas elu-
sive about the forearm but insisted on denying ownership of the left hand, even when it had been passively placed on the
right side of her trunk. She could not explain why her rings happened to be worn on the fingers of the alien hand.”
(Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991, p. 32-33).
Although patient LA-O reports her disturbed SoO in a verbal form, it is very plausible that her experience results from a
non-conceptual feeling of alienness and non-ownership. In contrast to this disturbance of the FoO, her JoO is still functioning
adequately: (i) She is able to inferentially self-attribute at least some body parts (her left arm and elbow), and, even more
importantly, (ii) she accepts her alien experience as alien, rather than forming a delusional ownership hypothesis about this
experience. Both facts reveal a largely intact belief formation system with respect to the way of action rationalization and
self-theorizing.
In contrast to this patient, other patients do not accept their peculiar body experience as a strange experience, but form a
delusional ownership hypothesis about this experience and maintain it despite different stored encyclopedic knowledge
about their body and despite the testimony of others. Consider, for example, the experience and attribution behavior of
the following patient, who was suffering from a right-sided fronto-temporo-parietal infarction:
‘‘Examiner: Whose arm is this?
A.R. (patient): It’s not mine.
Examiner: Whose is it?
A.R.: It’s my mother’s.
Examiner: How on earth does it happen to be here?
A.R.: I don’t know. I found it in my bed.
Examiner: How long has it been there?
A.R.: Since the first day.”
(Bisiach, Rusconi, & Vallar, 1991)
This patient does not just have a perceptual experience of alienness, as patient LA-O, but actually transits from this abnor-
mal experience to a formation of the (somatoparaphrenic) delusional belief that her arm belongs to someone else, namely
her mother, thus indicating an additional deficit in the JoO. In fact, within the construction of the JoO, it might especially
depend on the respective personal belief formation process whether an individual alien limb patient does actually develop
(i) no delusional belief at all, (ii) the delusion of asomatognosia (the delusional belief that one’s own body part belongs not to
oneself) or, by further positive determination of the delusional content, (iii) the delusion of somatoparaphrenia (the delu-
sional belief that one’s body part belongs to someone else).
7.2. Disturbances of the sense of agency
Following the thesis that the SoA is a complex crossmodal representation of different functional and representational lev-
els, also disturbances of the SoA can be present on different levels, namely on the level of FoA, JoA and AoR. This will be illus-
trated by two different disruptions of agency, namely ‘‘anarchic limb” and ‘‘anosognosia for one’s own hemiparesis”. While
the former will illustrate primarily a failure of the JoA and partly even of the AoR, the latter will exemplify a disturbance
primarily of the FoA and the JoA.
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7.2.1. Anarchic limb
Anarchic limb phenomena encompass complex movements of the upper extremity which are not intended by the subject
himself, although they are performed in a goal-directed and ‘‘intentional” way (i.e. they seem to serve a purpose) and with
fairly adequate movement parameters (Della Sala, Marchetti, & Spinnler, 1991). In contrast to alien limb, anarchic limb
clearly reflects a disturbance of the agency system, but not of the ownership system, in that the subject does not experience
the limb as alien, but as part of his body, which is, however, controlled by intentions that are not part of the subject’s actual
intentions. This claim is supported by the following patient report of experiencing an anarchic hand:
‘‘[The patient’s] left hand would tenaciously grope for and grasp any nearby object, pick and pull at her clothes, and even
grasp her throat during sleep [. . .]. She slept with the arm tied to prevent nocturnal misbehaviour. She never denied that
her left arm and hand belonged to her, although she did refer to her limb as though it were an autonomous entity”
(Banks et al., 1989, p. 456).
For this reason, one should strictly restrain from conflating disorders of agency and disorders of ownership by subsuming
both of them under the term ‘‘alien hand” (Banks et al., 1989; Marchetti & Della Sala, 1998; Spence, 2002).
One might hold that ‘‘anarchic hand” is actually not a disturbance of the SoA, since patients correctly recognize that there
is a discrepancy between the actual movement of their anarchic limb and their motor intentions (Frith et al., 2000). However,
given our framework of the SoA, we can disentangle the different levels: Whereas there is no intention for the anarchic
movement11 and thus a discrepancy between the seeming intention of the movement and the intentions of the patient, the
FoA does not occur (or, more precisely, a feeling of non-agency occurs), which is, in a certain way correct (although the seem-
ingly intentional movement of the limb is a pathologic malfunctioning).12 As a consequence of this situation, a feeling of the
kind ‘‘This is not my action” is produced and it may be accompanied by a feeling of irritation. Given such a feeling, a rational
way to come to a judgment concerning agency is the consideration that the activity of the limb is caused by its own, that it is (or
is part of) a separate agent with intentions of its own. Hence, the agency-related problem lies on the level of the JoA, where a
delusional belief is formed. Such inadequate beliefs might even have inadequate behavioral consequences. For example, one
might ascribe (and not only perceive) intentions to one’s hand and come to the belief that the hand might thus be open to influ-
ence of verbal instructions:
‘‘She often spoke to her own [affected] left hand, asking it to perform some movement, but the hand ‘did only what it
wanted to do’.” (Trojano, Crisci, Lanzillo, Elefante, & Caruso, 1993, p. 215; cited after Spence, 2002).
Like the fact that judgments and beliefs about ownership cannot be (sufficiently) explained by feelings about ownership,
beliefs about causation and intentional stances, i.e. about agency, can also not be explained by feelings about (non-)agency:
Whereas the detection of a discrepancy between one’s actual movements and one’s motor intentions might lead to the per-
ceptual experience of not being the initiator of the actual movement (FoA), it cannot explain why a person does or does not
ascribe intentions to it (JoA). Again, this depends on an interpretative judgment that is formed by ad hoc rationalization that
draws on contextual cues and belief states, in particular one’s personal background beliefs.
7.2.2. Anosognosia for one’s own hemiparesis
Patients exhibiting anosognosia for their own hemiparesis (AHP) most probably have a deficit in integrating the various
sensorimotor authorship indicators, thus leading to an incorrect FoA (though it is still open to debate whether the deficit is
primarily due to a deficit in integrating sensory feedback [‘‘ignored feedback hypothesis”, (Levine, 1990)] or rather in inte-
grating feed-forward motor intentions [‘‘feed-forward theory”, Heilman, Barrett, & Adair, 1998]). However, the fact (i) that
AHP patients do not simply accept their experience of having made a movement as false and (ii) that they cannot correct
their belief about this experience despite of manifold evidence, clearly shows that they are not just impaired in their FoA
but also in their JoA. Consequently, accounts which provide only an explanation for the disturbed FoA in AHP patients—like
certain versions of the comparator model account (Frith et al., 2000)—are insufficient in that they cannot explain the distur-
bance of the JoA.
They fail even more in explaining whymost of the AHP patients additionally develop abnormal beliefs towards the paretic
limb, as, for example, asomatognosia (the delusional belief that a body part is not owned by themselves) or somatoparaphre-
nia (the delusional belief that a body part is owned by a certain other person).13 In fact, a recent analysis showed that AHP is
not only behaviorally closely connected to abnormal beliefs about ownership and responsibility of the limb (92% of patients
with AHP exhibit such abnormal beliefs), but also anatomically (the right posterior insula is commonly damaged in AHP patients
with and without abnormal beliefs) (Baier & Karnath, 2008). Thus, due to the close connectedness of AHP and abnormal beliefs,
11 The fact that the patient ‘‘perceives” an intention of the hand is not at all pathological: Every normal person (including the psychiatrist) ‘‘perceives” the
intention of the hand in the very same way (as can be seen in the description of these cases, as e.g., ‘‘the anarchic hand prevents him from smoking”).
12 Another interpretation would be that there is indeed an intention for the anarchic movement which is, for pathological reasons, detached from all other
processing, such that neither (a) a feeling of ownership for the very intention arises (a topic which goes beyond the scope of this paper; see Vosgerau & Newen,
2007 for more details on this topic), nor (b) a feeling of agency can be established—instead, as already mentioned, a feeling of non-agency arises (which would
be, under this interpretation, false).
13 Likewise, these accounts cannot explain why, e.g. some schizophrenia patients with delusions of control ascribe responsibility of certain actions to a specific
other agent rather than to themselves or to nobody at all, cf. Synofzik et al., 2007.
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theories about AHP cannot confine themselves to just explaining a possibly disturbed FoA, but, moreover, also have to explain
the disturbed rationalization and belief modules.
8. Conclusion
Two central features of self-consciousness, the sense of ownership and the sense of agency, are based on complex mech-
anisms on several levels: A very basic level of sensorimotor integration, a non-conceptual level, a propositional level, and a
meta-representational level. The multi-level framework presented here does not only give a detailed naturalistic account of
these central aspects of self-consciousness but is also able to provide a comprehensive analysis and explanation of the dif-
ferent developmental stages of the SoO and the SoA and their specific pathological disturbances. Future research will refine
the framework by more detailed conceptual and empirical investigation of the involved factors and processes at the different
levels on the one hand, and of the interplay of the different levels on the other hand.
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